THE CHARLOTTE NEWS

And Evening Chronicle

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● W. C. Dowd, 1855-1927 ●

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Old Problem

City Plagued By Venereal Disease in Peace Times

The Social Hygiene Conference, meeting here last week, had a message of vital importance for Charlotte. Though its speakers used the round-about method of statement apparently universally used when quoting venereal disease statistics, they made themselves clear enough: the local situation as to vice and venereal disease is not peculiar to this time of war; for five years the rate of incidence has been very high. There was the recommendation that the fight be taken up by some agency other than the Police Department and the Army—— perhaps a civic club.

Perhaps the figures, as given, do not mean much, except as comparisons, but among those given:

In five years, Charlotte had 13,000 more cases of syphilis reported than of tuberculosis. 14,000 more cases of syphilis reported than of scarlet fever. 14,000 more than of diphtheria, 8,000 more than of measles, 14,000 more than of poliomyelitis, and 6,000 more cases of syphilis than of all these other diseases combined. There were 8,000 cases of gonorrhea reported during the period. There is a difference between cases reported to the City Health Department and the cases that exist. In that of gonorrhea, he estimated that with 8,000 cases reported, there were probably 80,000 cases in existence in the period.

That alone should be enough to put Charlotte on guard for all time; but it probably won't. If there is the possibility of some civic organization taking the responsibility of leading the fight, an active program might be outlined, and carried forward through the years as part of the community effort to stamp out venereal disease. It is logical to assume that this section, like all others, will forever be plagued by vice and attendant diseases, but there is no denying that unceasing police vigilance and the complete co-operation of the people of the community could lower the figures to a point below that of community danger and embarrassment.

Untoasted, undated and unvacuum-packed, meat has been the big merchandising sensation of the year.

Air Power

Its Ability To Soften Enemy Proving To Be Unlimited

Our Mr. Samuel Grafton, a columnist of clear vision and remarkably accurate information to back up his day-to-day observations, has refused to become over-enthusiastic about the possibilities of air power winning this war—at least winning it alone. He wrote, a few days before the fall of tiny Pantelleria offered a totally new lesson in the niceties of bombing:

"Air war rests on the theory that wars can be won by mere destruction. Strangely enough, that conception, the very basis of air war, still remains to be proved right. Stalingrad was the most thoroughly destroyed city in Europe, and it was not conquered. But France was conquered without being destroyed, and largely because of political factors, which air war disdains."

Without hastening to get on the other side of the fence, we might defend air war against Mr. Grafton simply by inserting a few more facts and observations, which he either overlooked, underestimated, or did not know at the time of his writing:

1. Air war reached a new peak against Pantelleria, and marked up the first air triumph in history which forced surrender without the risk of a single life among land forces.

2. Stalingrad stood, perhaps, because air power could not be brought to bear upon its defenders in the final days, as they were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with Germans.

3. France, though ruptured by political abortions, might not have fallen at all but for air supremacy held by the invaders. Surely the British-French armies in the Lowlands could not have been so battered in the absence of Nazi supremacy in the skies.

4. Air war, contrary to Mr. Grafton's statement, does not disdain political factors, but makes them, instead. On Pantelleria, it made enthusiastic Fascists into weary Fascists; the shock air power sample of the shock in store for Europe. And it converted the garrison as no other kind of war could.

No, this air power, whether used in hammering at German industry, or eating up Italian outposts, is still the most valuable weapon belonging to the Allies. Used to make the way for other forces, it can open up the Continent as could nothing else listed in the history of military action. It is ruining the enemy before our eyes.

In The Air

Aeronautical Commission Fills An Old Need For The State

Governor Broughton's appointment of the first North Carolina Aeronautics Commission, it seems to us, is at least a generation later than it should have been—but welcome and necessary nonetheless. It is significant that the Governor made his commission public by saying that its job was to "get the State set for great expansion in aviation." That will suffice to cover the field, we daresay, but it should be remembered that this is to be a permanent commission.

This body, destined to oversee the development of one of the greatest of all industries, will come to have more and more control over the lives of North Carolinians. It must not be supposed that this is a temporary, makeshift agency of government; it is here to stay, and will become far more important in years to come than it will be in the postwar period. Aside from preparing the way for the development of air travel and traffic in the State, the commission must also safeguard the rights of people and State in the great development. To now, the air lines have had the field to themselves.

The personnel of the Commission should be satisfactory to all. Most important consideration was that the Governor name at least some men who were acquainted with the problems of aviation. He appears to have done that, in the placing of a Fairchild executive, two licensed pilots, Senator Brooks of Durham and Ben Douglas of Charlotte on the body. The Senator originated the proposal for such a commission; Ben Douglas has been perhaps the leading advocate of the development of civic aviation in the Mid-South.

It is to be expected that this commission will do a thorough job in preparing the way for the coming of the age of flight into North Carolina, in the protection of rights, and in the improvement of air service in the State.

Term Four

Washington Sees Signs; There Are Clearer Ones

Washington correspondence indicates that a Fourth Term for President Roosevelt is in the making, and that all signs point toward his acceptance of the nomination and making the race. There are reports that the President has told close friends that he will be forced to run again, whether in war or peace. That apparently, is an acceptance of the theory that he is the only man capable of steering the nation through the making of the peace, even though Germany and Japan have been tied down before elections.

There is also the offering, as evidence, of the fact that the Republicans are stirring up talk with their Postwar Council, and trying to take the spotlight away from the President, who has been living so close to dramatic history that GOP fears an increase in stature. And there is the amendment offered by Senator Josiah Bailey, proposing limitation of future Presidents to two terms. The reasoning is that sufficient heat generated in debate might persuade President Roosevelt not to run, even though the amendment is defeated—as it probably will be.

The signs are acceptable to us; perhaps they actually are signs of the President's intent to make the fourth race. But a more reliable indication seems to us that he hasn't yet opened his mouth on the subject; that the higher-ups in the Democratic Party hem and haw in embarrassment when the subject is mentioned publicly. If the die had not been cast, there would be no such carryings-on. It seems to be at least an even bet that the plans are laid, and that they will be carried through to their natural conclusion. We've already decided that an attempt at Term Four is to be made. All we want to know now is: Can he make it? Are the needs of the world greater than the irritations

Only In The South

Invasion This Summer?

By Fletcher Pratt

(Overseas News Agency Military Expert)

THE character and direction of the Allied air raids will furnish about as clear an indication as could be wished that something in the offensive line will be attempted in Southern Europe this Summer but probably not much if anything in Northern Europe. Air raids are a form of old-fashioned shelling—a fact all too easily forgotten due to the difference in technique. That is, in the tactical field, in the zone where armies are about to operate, air raids are used to prepare the way for infantry attack. In the deeper, strategic zone their purpose is harrassment.

Now it is only in Southern Europe that our raids this Summer have been used tactically, against the direct military installations of our enemy. The long-range bombardments of Germany have been strategic, aimed at harrassment and the general breakdown of facilities. Of course it could be that this is just possibly part of an elaborate fake to convince the Germans we mean to attack in one place whereas really the blow will be delivered somewhere quite differently. It is one of the disadvantages of preparing for an assault by means of air raids that it tips the enemy off as to where an attack is coming. In spite of the massive weight of bombs dropped in some raids the airplane is still relatively inefficient at this business of shelling, still cannot prepare as rapidly as artillery fire.

To make an attack where the enemy expects it regardless of how effective the preparation is to attempt to bull through obstacles by main strength, a procedure which always leads to heavy losses in war. But in this case it is hard to see how any deception as to the main theater of the attack would be effective, no matter how cleverly the exact point of a landing were concealed.

As a matter of fact, it is also pretty difficult to see how an invasion of Northern Europe could be accomplished this Summer. It is doubtful whether we have either the men or the ships to do any such thing. Anywhere we landed on the Northern half of the continent we would be facing fairly open terrain, in which the whole of the German army could be brought into play, with relatively short and easy supply lines to their bases. We simply haven't the men to do it.

Much has been made of the strength of the British armed forces but it should be remembered that at least 2,000,000 of these are home guards, that is, part-time soldiers with full-time jobs, who would be extremely useful in defense if the Germans attempted to attack England, but who lack the artillery, mechanized forces and experience to conduct offensive operation in enemy territory. The American Army showed itself very green in Tunisia and also very small. Most of it, indeed, must be still far short of the training adequate even to embark on an operation where it would fight side by side with more experienced troops.

Actual figures are, of course, jealously guarded secrets but at the most liberal estimates it is doubtful whether we and the British together could put a hundred divisions in the field. An invasion of Northern Europe, whether on the coast of Germany itself or in Holland, France or Belgium, would be a blow at the heart of the Reich and the Nazis could confidently be expected to drop everything else and strike at it with their full power, if they went on the defensive in Russia, could not be much less than 200 divisions.

The only sensible strategic answer is to conduct invasion in a theater where the full German power cannot be developed. One instance of this was the attack on Africa. Southern Europe, with the exception of Southern France, is just such another instance. The Axis internal transportion system has unquestionably suffered heavily under the bombing attacks, and there are just not enough lines in any case running through the Alps down onto the Balkans for them to develop their full strength in opposition to any landing the Allied forces might make.

Moreover, the lack of experience in the American Army can be cured there as it was partly cured in Tunisia, while by another Summer many of the 5,000,000-odd men we now have in training will be fit for combat.

A review of the manpower situation thus leads to the same result as an examination of the bombing raids—the idea that any plunge into the main continent of Europe will have to wait for another year unless there is some now totally unexpected collapse there.

In the meantime, some sort of German motion against the Russians seems to be imminent. In spite of the severe demands in the West they have found means to concentrate very great air strength opposite the Russians, especially on the central sector, and they have been indulging in both tactical and strategic bombings there. In one sense, these bombings are of a quite a new type; the Germans seem to have gone in prepared to fight major aerial engagements and to be displaying a new type of mass air tactics, in which huge aerial forces are directed with the precision of armies on the ground. But this is only comparatively minor difference in technique. The important thing is the concentration itself, the fact that the Germans are going through all the motions preliminary to a ground offensive.

Right in the Pant-elleria

—By Dorman Smith

No Stalling

A Second Front Or Else

By Samuel Grafton

NEW YORK

STILL speculating on the second front. I think we ought to clear some underbrush out of the great debate.

The worst policy of all would be to talk second front stoutly all Summer, without establishing one, or its strategic equivalent. The great turn in this war came when the Summer of 1940 passed without a German invasion of England. England had expected it, her church bells had been held quiet many months to do duty as invasion signals, and German soldiers had been singing "We're Sailing Against England." When the Summer passed, the English caught their breaths and decided that perhaps there would be no invasion.

That was when the underground jokes against Hitler began, including the famous one about Hitler's discovery that the staff of Moses, which he had requisitioned in order to part the waters of the Channel, was in the British Museum. But the European underground could find us rather funny, too, in similar circumstances, after some of our recent speeches.

If there is no second front this Summer, the Germans will catch their second wind, exactly as the English once did. This is the climax, and it must be seized, and used. We cannot be sure there will be other, better years. The Germans were very sure there would be other years after 1940.

But what is it we must do in 1943? The popular picture is that we must land in Europe and march to Berlin. But that is not the second front, that is victory, and not quite the same thing. In the narrow, military sense, our task is to divert perhaps 75, perhaps 100, of the 218 Nazi and Nazi-satellite divisions now in Russia. That would be the true second front, because it would divide the Nazi army and make it fight on two fronts at once. That, and not the march to Berlin, is what Russia has in mind when she speaks of the second front.

The second front does not call upon us to win the war in Europe this Summer, but to fight the war in Europe this Summer. So, it seems to me, we shall have to amend the popular picture of a one-shot effort, leading straight to victory. It is a victory, but to make a front. Then, on the basis of the successful establishment of two fronts, Russia and we together can make a victory, which is a later chapter.

No one asks Russia to pursue a strategy of one-punch-for-victory in the East, and we cannot pursue a strategy of one-punch-for-victory in the West, either. The danger is that the admitted difficulties of making an overwhelming landing and at once liberating all of Europe might be used as excuses for not making a second front, which is our narrower and much more realistic task.

Our job is not to liberate Europe with one punch, but to compel the Nazis to fight in two areas at one time. Those who, perhaps rightly, find the former too difficult, should not, thereby, be allowed to avoid the latter.

It is an old device of public debate to pose a task that is more difficult than is really necessary, then prove its impossibility, and therefore do next to nothing. That is why I believe it would be useful to take the discussion down from the stratosphere of whether we are going to free the continent this year, and confine ourselves to the somewhat narrower point of whether we are finest this year, will confine ourselves to the going to split the Nazi armies, which is the essential condition for victory.

That would seem to rule out bombing as the chief tactic for the year, for bombing is war against limited, specialized forces, plus civilian defenders. It is not war against the Nazi army, per se, but only an adjunct of such war. We cannot win the war with adjuncts.

But the same conception frees our military leaders to do any one of a number of things, rather than one special thing. If by a series of feints, thrusts, limited landings, holding of beachheads, partial invasions, they can make Europe into a military merry-go-round and divide the Nazi armies, that will be the genuine and effective second front, even if we never penetrate ten miles within the continent this year.

The test is not whether we have a serious intention to retake all of France this Summer, but whether we have a serious intention to divide the Nazi armies. On that latter basis, we can maintain the confidence

Side Glances

"I'm glad there are two girls to see him off, dear—if he hasn't made up his mind, we'll still have him for a while when he comes home!"

Bit Of History

Right To Strike

THE pending anti-strike bill, passed by the House and probably by the Senate early this week, penalizes the fomenting of strikes in war plants taken over by the Government. For other war plants a compulsory cooling-off period and secret strike ballots are provided. However, the bill expressly allows an individual to withhold his labor of his own volition.

The right to strike was clearly guaranteed in the United States a hundred years ago, in England 70 years ago. The right was established here largely by judicial interpretations, always apt to be conflicting or even obscure. In England the right to strike was made more definite by law.

In the eighteenth century, strikes in England were held illegal under the common law as conspiracies in restraint of trade. The anti-combination act of 1800 rigorously regulated all working conditions, and forbade "combinations" to change them. An act of 1825 sanctioned combinations to improve wages and hours. An act of 1871 declared that unions as such were not to be held illegal as in the restraint of trade. Finally in 1875 an act specified that in a trade dispute actions by two or more persons were not to be considered an illegal conspiracy if such actions were legal when performed by an individual.

The Trade Disputes Act of 1927, following the British general strike of 1926, now expressly forbids attempts to coerce the community, such as sympathetic or secondary strikes and strikes which break a contract with a public governmental body.

In the United States early strikes were often prosecuted successfully as conspiracies, but after the first quarter of the nineteenth century such prosecutions were apt to be unsuccessful. In 1842 the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in the famous and frequently followed case, Commonwealth vs. Hunt, sanctioned even a strike for a closed shop. The court held that a strike was not a conspiracy unless pursued for ends in themselves illegal or unless advanced by illegal means. Some state laws make illegal strikes for certain aims—such as the closed shop, boycott of non-union materials, aid to other strikes. However, practically all these earlier state laws still on the statute books have become dead letters as unenforceable. No attempt was made to collect the fine assessed against the sit-down strikers in the automobile industry early in 1937.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century legal moves against strikes abandoned the common-law doctrine of conspiracy in favor of injunctions and antitrust suits. A Government injunction against a railroad strike was filed and enforced in 1894. In the Clayton Act of 1914 Congress rigidly limited these anti-strike methods in Federal courts, but the limitation was later upset by court interpretations. The Norris-La Guardia anti-injunction act of 1932 and recent decisions of the Supreme Court have again established the accepted intent of the Clayton Act.

In the outcry against strikes after the last war, the Senate voted, by almost 2 to 1, to forbid strikes on the railroads, but the House would not concur. Federal legislation does strictly limit the circumstances under which railroad strikes may legally occur. In 1922 the Government, through Attorney General Daughtry, procured a Federal injunction outlawing the strike of the railroad shopmen (a bituminous coal strike was also in progress). But the strikers soon returned to work under a compromise agreement, after little attempt had been made to enforce the injunction.

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 guarantees to employees the right to "engage in concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection."

Legislation in New Zealand and Australia forbids strikes under certain circumstances, in favor of compulsory arbitration. This limitation was supported by Labor itself when in political power, after a period when it had lost out in strikes. The legislation has often proved unenforceable, especially when Labor was out of power.—Editorial Research Report.

For Lidice

Black Anniversary

REP. KARL STEFAN (NEB.)

In Congressional Record

MR. Speaker, this is June 10, which is the first anniversary of the murder of a village by the Nazis—a murder boastfully proclaimed to the world by themselves and which is dedicated by the United States and all the United Nations to remembering.

The thing that we should remember and will remember is a little road leading down a gentle slope to a little village in a valley. It was Springtime, and the air was fragrant with blossoms. About 90 roofs clustered about the spire of a church. This was Lidice.

For over 600 years these little cottages, these outlying farms had been handed down from father to son; 400 people lived there; children played there; men worked there at farming, metal work, and mining. It was a small, happy, ordinary village—remote, peaceful.

Then one night the Nazis came. They came in their stamping boots and brown shirts.

Only one man lives today to tell the story of what happened in Lidice on that ghastly night. He hid in a hole outside the village when the Nazis came. He heard the screaming of the women and the children, the rattling of machine guns, after that the terrible silence—then the rumble of heavily loaded motor trucks, the bleating of a human herd being driven on the highway. Later he heard the roar of explosives, blast after blast. Then, creeping from his shelter, he saw his village ablaze—all of it.

What he heard was the shooting, before the eyes of their wives, mothers, children, sweethearts, and grandchildren, of 200 men, including an old man of 82; and the driving off of the women and children into concentration camps and correction schools.

Mr. Speaker, other villages have suffered a fate similar to Lidice—Polish, Yugoslav, Chinese villages. But in no other case has the murderer boasted of his crime. Lidice remains forever the flaming example of Nazi self-confessed atrocity.

Now, a year later, as we of the United Nations unload our bombs on Duesseldorf, Berlin, Essen, Dortmund, on Mannheim, we are remembering Lidice.

Visitin' Around

The Accurate Reporter
(North Wilkesboro Hustler)